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Abstract
When monitoring unsolicited network traffic automated
detection and characterization of abrupt changes in the traf-
fics statistical properties is important. These abrupt changes
can either be due to a single or multiple anomalous activities
taking place at the same time. The start of a new anomalous
activity while another anomalous activity is in operation will
result in a new change nested within the previous change.
Although detection of abrupt changes to identify malicious
activities has received considerable attention in the past, au-
tomated detection of nested changes has not been addressed.
In this paper a dynamic sliding window cumulative sum
(CUSUM) algorithm is proposed to automatically identify
these nested changes. The novelty of the proposed technique
lies in its ability to automatically detect nested changes,
without which interesting activities may go undetected, and
its effectiveness in identifying both the start and the end of
the individual changes. Using an analysis of real network
traces, we show that the identified nested changes were
indeed due to distinct malicious behaviours taking place in
parallel.
1. Introduction
Today’s evolving networks are experiencing a large num-
ber of different attacks ranging from system break-ins,
infection from automatic attack tools such as worms, viruses,
Trojan horses and denial of service (DoS). One important
aspect of such attacks is that they are often indiscriminate
and target Internet addresses without regard to whether they
are bona fide allocated or not. Different tools and techniques
have been developed to detect these attacks both on used [1]
and unused Internet address spaces [2], [3].
Due to the absence of any live host the traffic observed on
unused IP addresses is by definition unsolicited and likely
to be either opportunistic or malicious. The analysis of large
repositories of such traffic can be used to extract useful
information about both on-going and new attack patterns and
unveil and unearth unusual attack behaviors. The statistical
properties of network traffic are often good candidates for
such analysis. The idea is based on the observation that
anomalous activities such as denial-of-service attacks, worm
outbreak and port-scanning usually results in abrupt changes
in statistical properties of the traffic which either remain
constant or vary slowly over time during normal traffic
operations.
Although significant work has been done in the past
to detect abrupt changes with the aim of unveiling both
ongoing and new attack patterns, automatic detection of
nested changes has not been addressed. We argue that the
execution of multiple anomalous activities at the same time
will result in nested changes which should be separated to
identify the exact cause of different activities. One way to
detected multiple attacks is to monitor multiple traffic pa-
rameters in parallel such as by monitoring top n destination
ports, top n source addresses or top n destination addresses.
However parallel attacks such as the one on the same or
previously unknown destination port may go undetected us-
ing traditional change detection techniques. We believe that
multiple anomalous activities will result in multiple changes
in traffics statistical properties and effective detection of
these multiple nested changes will help in differentiating
between nested but distinct anomalous behaviors, without
which interesting activities may go undetected. In addition
our aim is to keep the technique simple by using minimum
information, such as total number of packets per unit time,
for automated detection of these parallel activities.
To the best of authors knowledge, this is the first work
that uses sliding window based non-parametric cumulative
sum method in the context of automated nested change
detection from large repositories of unsolicited traffic. The
paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews related
work and outlines our contribution. In Section 3 we for-
malize the change point detection problem and describe our
adaptive sliding window based non-parametric cumulative
sum (CUSUM) technique. In Section 4 we discuss the
effectiveness of our approach by experimentation on both
synthetic and real data sets. Section 5 summarizes the paper
and outlines further work.
2. Related Work and Our Contributions
Th objective of change point analysis is to find a point
in time where the statistical properties of the observed
parameter is transformed in such a way that it no longer
remains constant. Due to its simplicity and effectiveness it
has been extensively studied by various researchers in dif-
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ferent problem domains and different techniques have been
proposed by these researchers including spectrum analysis,
moving average charts, cumulative sum procedure and the
Shiryayev-Roberts procedure.
A non-parametric CUSUM algorithm is used by Chan et
al.[4] to identify worms which use a hit list of potential
target IP addresses to propagate through the network. Each
incoming source address is weighted based on heuristics
and the total weight in a given time window is calculated.
A non-parametric CUSUM is then applied on the total
(weighted) source address count which is then subjected to a
threshold test using a pre-selected threshold value. Moreover
the specific use of the algorithm in detecting only hit list
worms makes it less favorable in the analysis of network
traffic containing diverse anomalous activities.
Chen et al. [5] have provided a framework to detect dis-
tributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks using a distributed
change detection algorithm based on the non-parametric
CUSUM. In this technique each router is responsible for
generating change aggregation trees (CAT) which are then
sent to CAT servers for the final decision. The algorithm is
tested using an experimental test bed and a synthetic data
set.
Yu et al.[6] used a sliding window based technique
for anomaly detection in symmetric network traffic. The
threshold for change point was calculated dynamically using
a sliding window of fixed size. Using this approach on real
network traces with synthetically generated SYN flooding
attacks, it has been shown that not only the start but also
the end of an anomalous event can be detected effectively.
However it was observed by the authors in [7] that the use
of a fixed size sliding window does not provide satisfactory
performance during either normal or transient periods.
The work most closely related to our proposed tech-
nique is by Jian et al. [7]. The authors have provided
a parameter estimation technique based on a block-wise
least square algorithm. The proposed scheme consists of
a change detection algorithm and a variable length sliding
window. Although the proposed algorithm was effective in
detecting both abrupt and gradual changes, our proposed
technique is more robust in detecting not only different
changes associated with different anomalies but also by
being able to detect the start and the end of nested changes.
Moreover the authors have used a pre-selected threshold to
identify the start and the end of the change point in contrast
to the dynamic threshold adjustment technique used in our
proposed algorithm.
In this paper, a new adaptive nested change point detection
technique is proposed which is extended from the single
change point detection scheme reported in [8]. An adaptive
method is used to learn the upper bound on the estimated
mean (α) in contrast to the previous work where it is
selected based on some heuristics or experimental results.
The novelty of the proposed technique lies in its ability to
automatically detect any number of nested changes and its
effectiveness in identifying both the start and the end of the
individual changes and is validated through experimentation
using both synthetic data and real network traces. In sum-
mary, our contributions are highlighted below, the details of
which are given in subsequent sections:
1) Use of a sliding window based non-parametric
CUSUM algorithm to automatically detect nested
change points and their corresponding end points. We
argue that identification of nested anomalous activities
is important to identify the exact cause of change in
traffic dynamics and to effectively distinguish between
different sets of anomalous activities, without which
interesting activities may go undetected.
2) Use of the proposed technique to analyze large repos-
itories of unwanted traffic such as one observed while
monitoring a large number of unused IP addresses.
Although the proposed technique can be used to iden-
tify anomalous activities embedded in normal network
traffic, our aim is to use it in identifying new and
unusual attack patterns in large collection of unwanted
traffic.
3) Investigating the performance of the proposed tech-
nique by using both synthetically generated data sets
and by using 18 months of real network traffic col-
lected from a dedicated unused class C address block.
3. Change Point Detection
In a real time network traffic analysis, estimating traffic
distribution both before and after a malicious event is rather
a difficult task if not impossible due to the lack of a
complete model. In change detection, this problem can be
solved using a non-parametric CUSUM method as described
by Blazek et al. [9]. In [8], the authors adopted a non-
parametric CUSUM approach to detect single change in
traffic parameters because of its simplicity as no assumption
about underlying process probability distribution is required
a priori.
In order to describe the change detection algorithm let t1,
t2,...,tn be the fixed time instances and Nn be the number
of packets received by the monitoring system at time tn.
A malicious activity at time tk will result in the change in
statistical properties of the observed traffic parameter. If µk
be the mean traffic rate before and X¯k be the mean traffic
rate after the malicious event, then the CUSUM score Sk
can be calculated by
Sk = max
{
0, Sk−1 +Nk − µk − α · X¯k
}
(1)
where α is a tunning parameter belonging to the interval
(0,1) and is considered to be an upper bound on the estimated
post-change traffic rate X¯k. The choice of tuning parameter,
α, effects the performance of the algorithm as selecting too
small or too large an α value will increase the false alarm
rate. The α value can either be replaced with a constant
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value based on experimentation [8] or can be calculated
dynamically [10] using equation given below:
0 ≤ α ≤ 1− µk + hk/T
X¯k
(2)
where hk is the detection threshold at time tk and T is
the maximum time in which the change should be detected.
The average number of packets at time tk can be estimated
iteratively using an exponential weighted moving average
(EWMA):
X¯k = (1− β) · X¯k−1 + β · Nk (3)
where 0 < β < 1 is a smoothing factor which gives more
weight to the current observation. The CUSUM score, Sk,
given in Equation 1 is then subject to a threshold test h in
order to detect a change, Sk value greater or equal than the
threshold will indicate a change in parameter properties. The
threshold value h at time tk can be calculated as
hstartk = σk−1, h
end
k = 0.25 · hstartk (4)
where hstartx and hendx are the threshold values for the start
and the end of the change point at time tk and σk−1 is the
standard deviation of the data elements in current window at
time tk . In order to reduce the false alarm rate, an additional
counter τ is used along with hendk to mark the end of a
change point, the alarm is not canceled until timer τ reaches
a specified value, see Equation 5.
Alarm = if(Sk ≤ hendx AND τ ≥ 2, terminate, resume) (5)
3.1. Nested Change Points
The change in traffic dynamics can be due to a single
anomalous activity or multiple anomalous events taking
place in parallel at the same time. The recent work in change
point identification detects parallel anomalous activities by
monitoring multiple parameters in parallel such as by moni-
toring top n destination ports or top n source addresses. We
argue that the parallel anomalous activities can be detected
using minimum information such as total number of packets
per unit time as a single change point can be due to different
anomalous activities executing in parallel, resulting in a
significant change in already changed statistical properties
of the parameter under investigation. This will forced us
into the investigation of what we call nested change points.
Automated identification of these nested changes can help in
identifying parallel anomalies which might go undetected us-
ing traditional change detection techniques described above.
In order to make our point let us assume that on port x
at time t a network experience a malicious activity which
continued till t′, such that t′ > t. If at time k a different
port y is attacked, given t′ > k > t, then the dynamics
of observed traffic parameter will multi-transform first at
time t and then at time k resulting in nested change points.
Even the outbreak of different malicious activity at time
k on the same port x, given t′ > k > t, will result in
the multi-transformation of parameters statistical properties.
Identification of these nested change points is critical not
only in effective categorization of different attack behaviors
but also to identify exact cause of change in traffic dynamics.
3.2. Nested Change Detection
In order to detect nested change points, we have extended
the variable length sliding window based approach proposed
in [8]. This can be achieved by keeping track of traffic
dynamics before and after each change point. Let Wtn be the
sliding window holding data points at time tn and W xtk−1 =
Wtn and W xtk+cons be the pre-change sliding window holding
data elements before change and the fixed length sliding
window holding the data points after the change x at time
tk respectively, where x = 1, 2, ...., n. Let us assume that
the change x is ended at time te where te > tk. During that
time a new anomalous activity at time tz results in a new
change x + 1, where te > tz > tk, then change x + 1 and
x are considered to be the nested change points.
Under this situation W x+1tz−1 = W
x
tk+cons will be the pre-
change window and W x+1tz+cons will be the fixed length sliding
window holding data points after the change x + 1 at time
tz . Every new data point at time tz+1 will first be compared
with hendx+1 to identify the end of change x + 1, if the test
is successful, and then be compared with hendx to identify
the end of the previous change x. After the termination of
all nested changes, any new data point will be analyzed
for a possible change in traffic dynamics using dynamic
sliding window Wtn . If no change point is identified then the
data point is added in the sliding window and the window
is slided or expanded based on its current length and the
maximum length. Note that the sliding window Wtn will
gradually be filled with data points related to normal activity
and is being used as a base line behavior to identify changes
in traffic statistical properties.
4. Evaluation
In this section the performance of our proposed method
is evaluated using datasets consisting of both synthetic and
real network traces.
4.1. Experimental Setup
To study the effect of window sizes on the performance
of the proposed algorithm, windows of different sizes were
used with the synthetic data set. As noted in [8], it is
observed that selecting a window size greater than 60 has no
or little effect on the performance of the proposed algorithm.
Based on the experimental results the maximum size of
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window before it starts sliding is selected to be 100 where as
the constant size of the sliding window during the change is
5. Due to space limitations the results of this experimentation
are not included in the paper. The other parameters including
α and hk were calculated dynamically.
4.2. Synthetic Data
To use the proposed technique for the analysis of large
repositories of unsolicited traffic, a synthetic data set which
closely approximates such network traces is created. For this,
18 months of real network traffic collected from a dedicated
class C darknet is first analyzed and any outliers in the traffic
removed. The traffic dynamics including mean and standard
deviation of the network traffic is then calculated which
are used to generate a synthetic data set consisting of 1000
data points. Using the generated data set as noise, different
anomalous events having both high intensity attacks, whose
mean amplitude is 250% higher than the mean traffic rate,
and low intensity attacks, whose mean amplitude is 50%
higher than the mean traffic rate were generated [11]. Table 1
provides a summary of the anomalous events generated in
synthetic data set.
Table 1. Synthetic data
No Intensity Duration Start time Change end-
Data 1 Data 2 Data 1 Data 2 Data 1 Data 2 ing first
1 High High 10 4 51 54 Change 2
2 High Low 10 4 101 104 Change 2
3 Low High 10 4 151 154 Change 2
4 High High 10 4 201 206 Same
5 High Low 10 4 251 257 Same
6 Low Low 10 4 301 306 Same
7 High High 10 10 351 357 Change 1
8 Low High 10 4 401 406 Change 2
9 High High 10 10 451 457 Change 1
10 Low High 10 10 501 507 Change 1
The data set consists of ten nested (anomalous) changes.
The change duration is specified in terms of observation
period. For example, the duration of 10 means that the attack
is continuous for 10 consecutive observation periods. The
last column specifies which change ends first. For example
in the first row Change 2 ends before Change 1, and in
fourth row both changes ends at the same time.
Figure 1 (a) shows the data set used in the evaluation
of the proposed technique. Figure 1 (b) shows the result
of applying the proposed technique, where 1 represents
Change 1 and 2 represents Change 2. Note that the algorithm
was successful in detecting both start and end of nested
changes in all cases. However the algorithm mis-identified
the end of Change 1 in cases where Change 1 ends before
the end of Change 2 (no 7,9 and 10 in Table 1) and Change 2
(no 2,3,4 and 8 in Table 1). The algorithm completely missed
Change 2 (6 and 7 in Table 1). Whereas in 1,5,9 and 10 the
algorithm mis-labeled either the start or end of Change 2.
It is observed that the effective identification of nested
events largely depends upon their relative intensity. In
addition the absence of any extra information, about dif-
ferent events, using only the combined traffic will make
the algorithm largely dependent on relative intensity of the
events and spread of data points within each event. The
only information available in this experiment was the total
number of packets per unit time which makes it difficult to
effectively identify nested events.
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Figure 1. Synthetic data set
Although the algorithm was successful in identifying the
existence of nested events in most cases, 8 out of 10,
we believe that the performance of the algorithm can be
improved by considering extra information about events
such as destination port targeted, number of unique source
IP addresses and number of unique destination addresses
targeted along with total number of packets and is part of
our future work.
4.3. Real Network Trace
In order to evaluate the applicability and usability of
the proposed technique on real data, we have tested the
algorithm on 18 months of data collected from dedicated
class C darknet. In this section, the results of the proposed
technique on UDP traffic collected on the darknet between
27 November 2006 and 15 May 2008 will be discussed.
Figure 2 shows the UDP traffic observed on the darknet
during the monitoring period and corresponding change
points detected using the proposed technique.
In this section, due to space limitation we will limit our
discussion to the three out of ten nested change points
identified by our algorithm. The summary of nested change
points observed on UDP traffic is given in Table 2. The
value in brackets are the percentages of traffic observed on
the specific destination port during the change point and the
pre-nested columns gives the values during the first change
point.
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The first and the longest change point was observed on
12/12/2006 which continued for over three weeks. During
this period four different nested change points were identi-
fied, on 14th, 21st, 27th and 30th of December 2006. The
primary cause of this change was due to a sharp increase
in the traffic on destination port 137, more that 70% of the
total traffic was observed on port 137. This port is used by
NETBIOS name service and also by trojan Msinit. During
analysis it was observed that all of the traffic on this port was
from small number of source IP addresses, 2 to 3 sources
per day. Also the source ports used by these sources were
either 137 or 1024+n which confirms the existence of worm
looking for unprotected network shares as a first step to
enumerate and maybe exploit these open file shares.
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Figure 2. Darknet traffic trace (UDP)
The nested change point identified on 14th of December
2006 was due to the increase in traffic on two different
destination ports 1026 and 1027, more than 75% percent of
the total traffic. This is due to the increase in MS Messenger
NetSend spamming actvity which is generally related to
the pop up messages on MS machines. By default, that
“messaging” service runs on UDP/1026 for Windows 2000
and Windows XP, but it can be set to different ports. It is
interesting to note that after the end of the first nested change
no activity was obserevd on the ports 1026 and 1027.
The second nested change on 21st of December 2006 was
due to the increase in traffic on ports 1031, 1032 and 1033.
It is interesting to note that the pre-nested destination ports
have now two ports, 137 and 1434, collectively receiving
more than 74% of the total traffic. The traffic observed on
port 1434 was due to MS SQL Slammer worm that tries
to exploit the buffer overflow vulnerability without being
authenticated by the server. However in the absence of any
extra information such as destination ports, it is not possible
for the algorithm to distinguish between the first change
point, port 137, and the change point before the second
nested change, port 137 and 1434. We believe that this
can be improved by monitoring different traffic dynamics in
parallel as will be discussed further in the coming section.
The third nested change on 27th of December 2006 was
due to increase an in traffic on ports 137 and 1434. In this
case our darknet observed a large increase in the number of
packets targeting on these two ports, a total of 1415 UDP
packets were observed in the third change point in contrast
to just 669 packets in the pre-nested change point. The fourth
nested change point was again due to the increased activity
on ports 1031,1032 and 1033.
During the analysis of the above change point, it was
observed that the total number of unique sources during each
day of the change point was almost the same, around 75 to
80 unique sources on each day, and only small number of
destination ports, less than 15, were targeted during this three
weeks period.
The second change point started on 10/01/2007 and ended
on 17/01/2007. The second change point was due to the
increased MS SQL slammer activity on port 1434 and
increased traffic on port 137, receiving more that 52% and
39% of the total traffic respectively during first change point.
The nested change point was observed on the last day of this
change point, on 17/01/2007. It was observed that the nested
change point was due to the increase in activity on the same
two ports. This is due to the fact that during the first change
the average number of packets observed per day was 659
which increased to 968 per day during the nested change
points. In this case both changes ended on the same day.
Even though the same set of destination ports were
targeted during the pre-nested and nested change points,
identification of the nested change points in this case will
alert to the possibility of changes in other traffic dynamics
such as number of unique sources, number of unique pay-
loads, number of destination addresses and even increase in
malicious activity from the same source address.
The ninth change point was observed from 12th to 20th
of April 2008. The nested change was observed on 16th
which continued for three days. Note that on each day of
both changes different sets of destination ports were targeted,
with no port targeted on multiple days, and more than 98%
of the traffic targeted the same destination IP x.x.x.221. It is
important to note that more than 98% of the source addresses
related to this activity were observed on the darknet only
on the day of the activity. During this event an increase in
unique sources is also observed.
Although we do not know at this stage what really caused
this kind of behavior, it is the main cause of a huge spike
in the number of UDP packets collected by the darknet in
the respective days. The close proximity of these relative
activities and their distinct behavior is indeed due to some
unknown but interesting phenomenon which we aim to
analyze in detail and is part of our future work. Moreover as
the traffic collected on the darknet is by definition malicious,
it is very difficult to comment on the false alarm rate of the
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Table 2. Summary of nested change points observed in a UDP traffic
CP Date Average Packets Average Sources Destination ports
First CP Nested CP Pre-Nested Nested Pre-Nested Nested Pre-Nested Nested
1 12/12-06/01/07
14/12/2006 550 1515 106 73 137(70.5) 1026-1027(75.9),137(16.7)
21-23/12/06 618 1667 79 71 137(51.8),1434(25.5) 1031-1033(39.1),1434(18.4)
27/12/06 669 1415 78 81 137(45.2),1434(29.6) 137(72.1),1434(13.4)
30/12/06 657 1338 78 75 137(44.9),1434(31.9) 1031-1033(56.57),1434(19.5),137(18.9)
2 10-17/01/07 17/01/07 659 968 71 81 1434(52.5),137(39.1) 1434(67.8),137(26.2)
3 20-21/01/07 21/01/07 651 2543 63 54 137(39.4),1434(33.3) 1030-1035(60.4),137(10.3),1434(7.1)
4 08-11/04/07 09/04/07 628 1101 67 83 1026(46.5),137(41.4) 1026(56.7),137(23.2)
5 21-30/05/07 22-23/05/07 778 1133 106 104 137(67.8),1434(18.4) 137(56.8),33667(25.9),1434(7.1)
6 03-11/06/07 11/06/07 668 1135 62 75 137(82.5) 137(87.7)
7 13-20/07/07 18-20/07/07 555 1087 61 74 137(49.5),1030-1034(17.3) 137(43.1),1030-1034(34)
8 28-29/08/07 29/08/07 1332 2749 317 811 137(30.1),1026-1028(57.65) 137(9.34),1026-1028(83.8)
9 12-20/04/08 16-18/04/08 18757 52257 276 844 13398(56.2),13048(22),13408(17.2) 13763(30.7),13979(5.5),13493(58.3)
10 07-15/05/08 10/05/08 244 4342 49 357 137(35.3),53(35) 13284(97.6)13-15/05/08 229 63021 56 1166 137(22.7),13593(21.4) 13274(50),62997(20.7),13205(14.2)
proposed technique. On the other hand our experiment with
the proposed technique shows that all the nested changes
identified by the proposed technique was indeed distinct
malicious behaviors observed by the darknet. While the
proposed algorithm can be used in parallel, for example
monitoring top 10 destination ports in parallel, our aim is
keep the technique simple by using minimum information,
such as total number of packets per unit time, for automatic
detection of these parallel activities.
5. Conclusion and Future Directions
In this paper, we have proposed an adaptive sliding
window based technique for automatically detecting nested
changes. We extended the sliding window technique [8]
to detect any number of nested changes. The motivation
behind our work was to detect nested but distinct anomalous
behaviors in large repositories of unsolicited traffic using
minimum information. The effectiveness of the proposed
technique is analysed using both synthetic and real network
traces. During experimentation with synthetic data it is noted
that the proposed technique effectively identified nested
events in most cases. The applicability and usability of the
proposed algorithm is analysed with the help of real network
traces. It is observed that the proposed technique effectively
identified nested behaviors in UDP traffic collected from
the darknet. Even though in both synthetic and real network
traces at most two nested changes were identified, we believe
that the algorithm can detect any number of nested changes.
We suggest that the results can be improved by parallel
analysis of multiple traffic parameters. Extending the pro-
posed approach to multiple traffic parameters and correlation
of detected change points may help in identifying the degree
of involvement of these parameters in the detected change.
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